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1R&D Investment, Market Structure, and
Industry Growth
Abstract
We study how alternative market structures inﬂuence market supply and R&D invest-
ment decisions of ﬁrms operating in dynamic imperfectly competitive environments. Firms
can reduce their future production cost through R&D investment today, which is the engine
of endogenous industry growth. Our framework enables us to identify key strategic ingre-
dients in ﬁrms’ dynamic competitive behavior through analytical characterizations. These
ingredients are a static market externality, stemming from the standard oligopolistic Cournot
competition, a dynamic externality that arises due to knowledge spillovers, and a dynamic
market externality that comes from the interaction of knowledge spillovers with future mar-
ket oligopolistic competition that ﬁrms internalize while making decisions. We isolate the
impact of each strategic ingredient by comparing four alternative market structures.
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21. Introduction
Investment in Research and Development (R&D) by ﬁrms is widely considered as one of the
major engines of industry growth. A crucial type of R&D investment is cost innovation, i.e.
investment that aims at reducing the production cost per unit of output. By undertaking
a cost of investing in production knowledge today, a ﬁrm can reduce its future production
cost and increase its future proﬁt margin.
The possibilities for a ﬁrm to increase its proﬁt margin through R&D investment are
inﬂuenced by the existing market structure of the industry. For example, a monopoly may
enjoy a high proﬁt margin today, which may give the chance for high R&D investment, in
order to achieve more proﬁts in the future. If, however, monopolistic rents are already high
enough, the monopoly may not have a strong incentive to undertake the cost of increasing
this proﬁt margin at a high rate, relative to other industrial structures.
On the other hand, Cournot competition in the ﬁnal goods market may pressure duopolis-
tic ﬁrms to increase their future proﬁt margin by undertaking more R&D investment. Or,
duopolistic ﬁrms, due to intense competition, may end up with little resources to ﬁnance
enough R&D investment. Such conﬂicting incentives for R&D investment call for a theoret-
ical treatment of the strategic elements that arise in diﬀerent market structures.
Early literatures outlined by Kamien and Schwartz (1975) and Reingaum (1984) reveal
that the question we pose in this paper is a very old one. Examples of studies focusing on
the link between market structures and the intensity of lump-sum R&D spending are Loury
(1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), and Lee and Wilde (1980). These studies suggest that
innovation eﬀort of each ﬁrm declines with competition, yet a larger number of ﬁrms in an
industry may lead to higher aggregate R&D spending. Recent empirical work testing the
conclusions of such models about the link between market structure and innovation intensity
1suggests that competition and innovation have an inverted U relationship.1
In contrast with previous work that focuses on lump-sum R&D spending decisions in
order to create or enter a market, we study R&D investment as a ﬂow variable that can
improve existing production cost smoothly. We suggest that ﬁrms operating in a ﬁxed
market structure and having the chance to cost-innovate at any point in time face diﬀerent
strategic dilemmas compared to these in cases where R&D is a lump-sum spending decision.
In particular, inter-temporal considerations, like these stressed by McDonald and Siegel
(1986) about monopolistic R&D investment, are linked up with intra-temporal Cournot-
competition mechanics of oligopoly. Thus, our work relates to the dynamic-game approach
of Mirman (1979) and Levhari and Mirman (1980).
We link R&D investment to industry growth directly in a deterministic framework.2
A ﬁrm faces certain growth opportunities and its inter-temporal allocation of resources is
aﬀected by its ability to inﬂuence industry growth.
In order to study the link between market structure and growth-enhancing R&D invest-
ment, we identify and isolate, one by one, the strategic components of ﬁrm market supply
and R&D investment in four alternative market structures. After studying a monopoly as a
benchmark case, we compare it with alternative market structures that add a new strategic
element each time.
The presence of another ﬁrm in the market gives rise to the usual Cournot-type sta-
tic market externality. In order to isolate the impact of the static market externality on
R&D investment strategies of ﬁrms and industry dynamics, we study a setup in which two
symmetric ﬁrms accumulate knowledge that is protected by patents. With patents, knowl-
1 See, for example, Aghion et. al. (2002). Moreover, another example of theoretical literature stressing the
importance of the Schumpeterian idea of “creative destruction,” for innovation is this of Aghion and Howitt
(1992).
2 Adding uncertainty is an extension that would not alter our main conclusions in this study.
2edge is a perfectly excludable and rivalrous good. The comparison between the benchmark
monopoly and this duopolistic setup is made in section 3. We ﬁnd that key parameters of the
model, like the demand elasticity determine the link between the static market externality
and industry growth: a low demand elasticity induces a more intensive Cournot quantity
competition that leaves little space for R&D investment, leading to lower growth.
The law of motion of knowledge of the benchmark monopoly changes if there are is
another ﬁrm that undertakes R&D investment and there is a knowledge spillover, i.e. if
accumulated knowlegde is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. When other ﬁrms also in-
vest in knowledge, because the knowledge spillover directly aﬀects the dynamic equation
of knowledge accumulation, we say that the knowledge spillover is a dynamic externality.
The impact of the dynamic externality on ﬁrm behavior is twofold, it will aﬀect, (i) the
future R&D return, and (ii) the future supply quantity. By examining a market structure
of two monopolists with knowledge spillovers and by comparing this organization with the
pure monopoly we isolate the inﬂuence of the dynamic externality on industry growth. We
present this analysis in section 4. We ﬁnd that the impact of the dynamic externality de-
pends on parameter values that determine whether ﬁrms do or do not free-ride on each other
for the beneﬁts of innovation.
When two ﬁrms are in the same market and there are also knowledge spillovers, both the
supply strategy and next period’s knowledge stock are directly inﬂuenced by the presence
of each other. Firms project and internalize the future interplay between the static market
externality and the dynamic externality. This means that a more complex externality arises
in this market structure, a dynamic market externality. In section 5 we study the role of this
externality type in industry dynamics, ﬁnding that it enhances industry growth.
Our analysis is similar to this in Koulovatianos and Mirman (2003), in which the focus
3is the optimal utilization of industry-speciﬁc capital in diﬀerent market structures. Even
though both the economic question and setup in Koulovatianos and Mirman (2003) are dif-
ferent from these in this this study, the static market externality and the dynamic externality
are, again, the main determinants of the link between market structure and industry growth.
A problem with dynamic games is that there are no widely-known general modeling
conditions guaranteeing equilibrium existence or leading to certain properties of strategies.3
This is the reason why we present a parametric model that enables us to have analytical
characterizations. Our goal is to have a tractable model that emphasizes the economic
behavior of ﬁrms in various market structures. Moreover, the parametric model of our study
is a testable framework, despite its parameter restrictions. These parameter restrictions can
be handled through data-mining approaches in empirical work.
2. The Benchmark Monopoly Model
Consider a ﬁrm operating in inﬁnite horizon, t =0 ,1,..., facing an inverse demand function
pt = D(qt) ,
for all t =0 ,1,.... The cost function depends on the quantity of the produced ﬁnal good
and the stock of knowledge possessed by the ﬁrm with respect to production technology,
ct = C (kt)qt ,
where kt is the accumulated stock of knowledge at time t. The cost function has C  < 0, i.e.
the higher the stock of knowledge, the lower the production cost per unit of ﬁnal good.
3 Some theoretical work on dynamic games includes Dutta and Sundaram (1992) and (1993). On the other
hand, some work about computing dynamic games has been developed, like this of Vedenov and Miranda
(2001) and Pakes and McGuire (2001), whereas Ericson and Pakes (1995) show the importance of Markov-
perfect dynamics of dynamic games for empirical work.
In fact, several recent papers still deal with the issue of existence and uniqueness of Cournot-Nash
equilibrium in static frameworks. See, for example, Gaudet and Salant (1991), Novshek (1984a), (1984b)
and (1985).
4Each period, the monopolistic ﬁrm can invest in knowledge. With xt denoting R&D
spending in period t, the ﬁrm accumulates knowledge according to the rule,
kt+1 = kt + f (xt) ,( 1 )
with f  (x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0. The objective of the ﬁrm is to determine a ﬁnal-good supply





t [D(qt)qt − C (kt)qt − xt] ,( 2 )
under the constraint (1) with δ ≡ 1
1+r,w h e r er>0 is a constant interest rate, and given an
initial knowledge stock k0 > 0.
The problem of the ﬁrm written in a Bellman-equation form is,
VM (k)= m a x
q,x≥0
{D(q)q − C (k)q − x + δVM (k + f (x))} .( 3 )
Our goal is to obtain and characterize closed-form results for all market setups in this paper.
For this reason, we use a speciﬁc parametric version of the model that enables us to have
solutions of the form Q(k)=ωk and X (k) such that f (X (k)) = γk. In particular, the
inverse demand function is given by,
D(q)=q
− 1
η ,( 4 )
i.e. it is a constant-elasticity demand function with η>1. The cost function is,
C (k)q = νk
− 1
ηq ,( 5 )
with ν>0, and the knowledge production function is
f (x)=x
η
η−1 ,( 6 )
5reﬂecting the reasonable assumption that R&D investment exhibits increasing returns in
knowledge production.
Although the presence of parameter η in all functions (4), (5), and (6) seems restrictive,
these functional forms enable us to obtain linear decision rules for all cases of monopoly and
duopoly throughout this paper. These linear rules are easy to characterize and in this way
we can isolate, one by one, each and every strategic aspect of ﬁrm decisions. The decision
rules will be of the form,




η−1 = γk ,( 8 )
with ω,γ > 0. Substituting the decision rules (7) and (8) into the objective function of the




η − νω− γ
1− 1
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η .( 9 )
In order to identify the conditions that characterize ω and γ we must form the Bellman
equation using (9). This is given by:
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≡ κM .( 1 2 )















,( 1 3 )
there exists a unique strategy x
η
η−1 = γMk,s u c ht h a tγM satisﬁes equation (12)
and such that the value function is bounded and the life-time proﬁts are positive.
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M (γ) < 0 .( 1 7 )
































The relationship (17) together with the intermediate value theorem imply that there exists a






which means also that (15) holds.
The condition given by (13) has a direct economic interpretation. In equilibrium, the




















 η reﬂects the proﬁtability of selling the ﬁnal good in the market per
unit of accumulated knowledge. Thus, meeting inequality (15) is equivalent to saying that
the proﬁtability of selling in the market should be greater than the R&D expense, linked to
the growth rate of knowledge, γ. On the other hand, meeting inequality (14) means that
the period-by-period cost of accumulating knowledge should not exceed the gross interest
rate (associated with the discount factor, δ), which reﬂects the period-by-period opportunity
cost of being in this industry. Inequality (13) guarantees that both (14) and (15) are met:
in order to have positive bounded proﬁts and R&D investment, the proﬁtability of selling in
the market should be high enough to cover the opportunity cost linked with the exogenous
interest rate, r.
In contrast to a monopoly operating in a static environment, the dynamic monopoly
takes into account the extra current cost of investing in R&D and its inﬂuence on the future
cost of production per unit of ﬁnal good, through the accumulation of knowledge. This is
obvious from the ﬁrm’s Euler equations. In particular, the ﬁrst-order conditions implied by
(3) are,
D(q)+D









  (x) ,( 1 9 )
where   k is the stock of knowledge in the subsequent period. From equation (18) we can
derive the ﬁrm’s optimal quantity as a function of knowledge, q = QM (k).A c c o r d i n g t o
equation (19), the monopolist equates the marginal cost of current R&D investment (which
is equal to one) with the discounted change in next period’s life-time proﬁts due to a change
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the supply of the ﬁnal good in the subsequent period which complies with (18). The Euler
equation (21) implies that the ﬁrm counterbalances the current marginal product of R&D
in terms of knowledge units (given by the term f  (x)), with the future marginal knowledge
product as this interacts with the potential to reduce the ﬁnal-good production cost in the


















f  (x) is straightforward: it is the marginal return of R&D investment
between the current period and one period ahead.
Remembering that δ = 1

















  (  x) .( 2 2 )
9This last expression reminds a typical necessary condition in optimal-growth models dealing









having a negative sign, shows the potential for increasing monopolistic proﬁts by taking
actions not only in the market today, but also by taking actions that inﬂuence the future
potential for proﬁt making. Spending R&D money today has an opportunity cost: this
money could be invested elsewhere, yielding r return per dollar. But reducing production
costs tomorrow gives a proﬁt margin that can compensate for the R&D spending. Thus,









f  (x) is the gross eﬀective interest rate paid for investing in knowledge,
the opportunity cost of a dollar today minus the marginal return of a dollar invested in R&D.
So, the interpretation of the monopolist’s Euler equation is: the optimal R&D management
of the ﬁrm necessitates that its marginal knowledge output today, f  (x), should equal its
marginal knowledge output tomorrow, multiplied by the gross eﬀective interest rate paid for
investing in knowledge.
2.1 The pure monopolist’s Euler equation as a basis for compari-
son of alternative market structures




.T h i st e r m ,
complying with equation (18), captures the fact that the market organization inﬂuences
the R&D strategy. This is the gist of our analysis: to examine how the market structure
inﬂuences R&D investment and, consequently, industry growth. The nature of the Euler
equation, which is also present in all other market organizations that we examine in this
paper, facilitates a clear understanding of the link between the market structure and industry
growth.
The presence of another ﬁrm in the market gives rise to the usual Cournot-type static
10market externality. This externality is captured by the way the supply function, QM (·),
changes. In order to isolate the impact of the static market externality on R&D investment
strategies of ﬁrms and industry dynamics, we study a setup in which two symmetric ﬁrms
accumulate knowledge that is protected by patents. With patents, knowledge is a perfectly
excludable and rivalrous good. The comparison between the benchmark monopoly and this
duopolistic setup is made in the section that follows.
The law of motion of knowledge of the benchmark monopoly,   k = k + f (x), changes if
there are is another ﬁrm that undertakes R&D investment and there is a knowledge spillover,
i.e. if accumulated knowlegde is non-excludable and non-rival. If, for example, there are two
identical ﬁrms, A and B, both investing in R&D and there are knowledge spillovers, the law
of motion of knowledge will be,
  k = k + f (xA)+f (xB) ,( 2 3 )
where xA and xB are the levels of R&D spending by the two ﬁrms. When other ﬁrms also
invest in knowledge, because the knowledge spillover directly aﬀects the dynamic equation
(23), we say that the knowledge spillover is a dynamic externality. The impact of the dynamic
externality on ﬁrm behavior is twofold, it will aﬀect, (i) the future R&D return, and (ii) the
future supply quantity. These inﬂuences will be reﬂected in the necessary optimal conditions
of each ﬁrm, and these conditions are very similar to equation (21).
If ﬁrms A and B are monopolists, equation (18) implies that the supply function, QM (·),
will not change. So, by examining a market structure of two monopolists with knowledge
spillovers, we learn about the inﬂuence of the dynamic externality, alone, on industry growth.
We present this analysis in section 4.
When ﬁrms A and B are in the same market and there are also knowledge spillovers, both
the supply function, QM (·), and next period’s knowledge stock, the input of this new supply
11function, change. Thus, the necessary conditions of each ﬁrm capture the fact that changing
the stock of knowledge tomorrow gives diﬀerent potential proﬁt margins when another ﬁrm
is also in the market. This element in dynamic oligopoly implies that the presence of another
ﬁrm in the market that also invests in non-excludable and non-rivalrous knowledge, will give
rise to a dynamic market externality. Section 5 studies the role of this externality type in
industry dynamics.
3. Duopoly with ﬁrms accumulating patent-protected knowledge
The goal of this section is to examine the impact of the static market externality on knowl-
edge accumulation. We isolate the impact of Cournot competition on R&D investment
strategies and industry dynamics. In order to achieve this goal, we examine a setup where
two symmetric ﬁrms sell their ﬁnal good in the same market, but each of the two ﬁrms has
access to its own stock of knowledge that each ﬁrm protects through patents. For simplic-
ity, we assume that there is no cost for obtaining a patent, there is only cost for obtaining
knowledge, not for protecting it. While we have been using the subscript “M”t od e n o t et h e
pure monopoly value function and decision rules, in this section we use the subscript “D”i n
order to denote this market structure, the duopoly in which ﬁrms protect their knowledge
stock by patents.
Consider two symmetric ﬁrms, A and B, selling the ﬁnal good they produce in the same





for t =0 ,1,...,w i t hη>1. Both ﬁrms start from the same level of knowledge in period 0,
that they protect by patents, i.e. kA,0 = kB,0 > 0. The two ﬁrms are symmetric also with
12respect to their cost functions The cost function is,




for ﬁrm A,a n d




for ﬁrm B,f o rt =0 ,1,...,w i t hν>0. The knowledge production function for both ﬁrms is
g i v e nb ye q u a t i o n( 6 ) ,s ot h el a wo fm o t i o no fc a p i t a lf o rb o t hﬁ r m si sg i v e nb y ,
kA,t+1 = kA,t + x
η
η−1
A,t ,( 2 4 )
and
kB,t+1 = kB,t + x
η
η−1
B,t .( 2 5 )
Due to the symmetry of the two ﬁrms, we can focus on the behavior of ﬁrm A, without
loss of generality. The objective of ﬁrm A is to determine a ﬁnal-good supply rule qA,t =
QA (kA,t,k B,t) a n da nR & Di n v e s t m e n tr u l exA,t = XA (kA,t,k B,t) for t =0 ,1,...,s ot h a ti t




t [D(qA,t + QB (kA,t,k B,t))qA,t − C (kA,t)qA,t − xA,t] ,( 2 6 )
under the constraint (24) and the strategies QB (kA,t,k B,t) and XB (kA,t,k B,t) of ﬁrm B,
given the law of motion (25), with δ ≡ 1
1+r,w h e r er>0 is the constant interest rate, and
given the initial knowledge stocks kA,0 = kB,0 > 0.
The problem of ﬁrm A, written in a Bellman-equation form is,
VA,D (kA,k B)= m a x
qA,xA≥0
 
D(qA + QB (kA,k B))qA − C (kA)qA− xA +
+δVA,D
 
kA +f (xA) ,k B + f (XB (kA,k B))
  
.(27)
13Using the speciﬁc parametric version of the model given by equations (4), (5), and (6) enables
us to have solutions of the form
QA (kA,k B)=ωkA ,( 2 8 )
QB (kA,k B)=ωkB ,( 2 9 )
[XA (kA,k B)]
η




η−1 = γkB .( 3 1 )
Substituting the decision rules (28), (29), (30), and (31), into the objective function of ﬁrm
A, as this is given by (26) and into the laws of motion given by (24) and (25), we arrive at
















1 − δ(1 + γ)
1− 1
η
.( 3 2 )
In order to identify the conditions that characterize ω and γ we must form the Bellman
equation using (32). This is given by





[qA + QB (kA,k B)]
− 1
η qA − νk
− 1
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1 − δ(1 + γ)
1− 1
η
,( 3 4 )
where   kA and   kB are the knowledge stocks of the two ﬁrms one period ahead. The Bellman
equation and the ﬁrst-order conditions of ﬁrm B are the same as these of ﬁrm A,w i t ht h e
roles of A and B switched. The symmetry of the fundamentals of the two ﬁrms, the symmetry
of the ﬁrms’ necessary optimal conditions, and the fact that also kA,0 = kB,0 = k0 > 0,i m p l y
that the knowledge stock of the two ﬁrms is the same at all times. This observation cross
validates the symmetric solution of the form QA (kA,k B)=ωDkA and QB (kA,k B)=ωDkB,









.( 3 5 )
Moreover, symmetry also implies the validity of the strategies [XA (kA,k B)]
η
η−1 = γkA and
[XB (kA,k B)]
η
η−1 = γkB. Substituting (35) and (30) into (34), we obtain the condition that




















≡ κD .( 3 6 )




















,( 3 7 )
there exists a unique couple of strategies x
η
η−1
A = γDkA and x
η
η−1
B = γDkB,s u c h
that γD satisﬁes equation (36) and such that the value function of each ﬁrm is
bounded and the life-time proﬁts of each ﬁrm are positive.
Proof Substituting ωD as given by equation (35) and the symmetry condition kA =
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− 1 ⇔ g
 
D (γ) < 0 .( 4 0 )





































The relationship (40) together with gD (0) = ∞, through the intermediate value theorem
i m p l yt h a tt h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u eγD satisfying (36).
The economic interpretation of the parameter constraint (37) is, again, that the proﬁtabil-
ity of selling in the market should be high enough to cover the opportunity cost associated
with the exogenous interest rate, r, and also to leave space for undertaking R&D investment.
Each ﬁrm’s optimality conditions reveal the diﬀerences from the pure monopoly case.
The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by (27), for ﬁrm A,a r e ,
D(qA + qB)+D









  (xA) ,( 4 2 )
where   kA and   kB are the stocks of knowledge in the subsequent period. Applying the envelope




  (kA)qA + D























 .( 4 3 )




∂ kB f  (xB)
∂XB(kA,kB)
∂kA in condition
(43) are the new strategic elements compared to the coreesponding condition of the pure
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∂VA,D
 






















  (  xA) .( 4 4 )
where   xA is the R&D expenditure in the subsequent period and the function QA,D
 
  kA,  kB
 
gives the supply of the ﬁnal good in the subsequent period which complies with (41) and
D(qA + qB)+D  (qA + qB)qB = C (kB), in the symmetric case of kA = kB.T h e t e r m






  kA,  kB
 
f  (xA) is the gross eﬀective interest rate paid for investing
in knowledge, the opportunity cost of a dollar today minus the marginal return of a dollar
invested in R&D. So, the interpretation of equation (44) again is that the marginal knowledge
output today, f  (xA), should equal the marginal knowledge output tomorrow, multiplied by
the gross eﬀective interest rate paid for investing in knowledge.
17The most interesting aspect of equation (44) is that, compared to the pure monopolist,
only the static market externality is added in the market structure of this section. This
is reﬂected by the fact that QA,D
 






, exactly in the way that
they would diﬀer in a static context. Yet, this seemingly simple departure from the pure
monopoly benchmark changes the dynamics dramatically: with a diﬀerent period-by-period
proﬁt margin due to oligopolistic competition, there are diﬀerent opportunities for R&D
investment.
3.1 The eﬀect of the static market externality on market supply
and industry growth
The comparison of the pure monopoly and the duopoly with patent protection of knowledge
reveals the impact of the static market externality on industry growth. The nature of the
linear quantity supply rules, that applies to both setups, enables a direct comparison.

















imply that in the duopoly aggregate market supply is higher compared to the monopoly
supply. But the growth rate of knowledge in each industrial setup determines the level of
market supply in the long run.
The growth rate of the pure monopoly is given by the level of γM that solves equation
(12), whereas the industry growth rate of the duopoly equals the level of γD determined by
(36).
18It is clear that
gM (γ)=gD (γ)
for all γ ≥ 0. Moreover,












if and only if η<2.73. Figures 2.a and 2.b depict the
equilibrium R&D decision rules for the two setups, for the cases where η<2.73 and η>2.73.
In all cases, parameters η, δ and ν must be such that the parameter constraints (13) and
(37) are met. Figures 2.a and 2.b make clear that
γD <γ M if and only if η<2.73 .
As it is the case in a static environment with isoelastic demand, both duopolists always












= ωM, so, each duopolist alone supplies more compared to
the monopolist, because the Cournot war is very intensive with low elasticity of demand. In
the dynamic context of our model, these static mechanics have a direct inﬂuence on R&D
investment and industry growth.
The low demand elasticity implies low marginal revenue for both the monopolist and the
duopolists. The lower the demand elasticity, the less a ﬁrm can gain from price increases by
contracting its supply. While playing their Cournot game with low elasticity, the duopolists
can expand their market supply with lower revenue loss due to price decreases. But below
the critical value 2.73 of η, the duopolists are carried away from their quantity competition
so that their aggregate market supply lowers the price and each ﬁrm’s proﬁts to a level they
do not have enough resources to ﬁnance as much R&D as the monopolist.
19In the case of high demand elasticity, η>2.73, for a given knowledge level, each duopolist
alone supplies less of the ﬁnal good compared to the monopolist, but the two duopolists
supply more on aggregate. The necessary conditions depicted in ﬁgure 2.b imply that each
monopolist alone will spend more resources on R&D investment compared to the monopolist.
So, for η>2.73, the duopolistic industry with patent-protected knowledge grows faster.
Our model points out that the elasticity of demand plays a critical role in determining the
inﬂuence of the market externality on industry dynamics.4 A low demand elasticity induces
a more intensive intra-period quantity war for the duopoly that leaves little space for R&D
investment, compared to the investment ability of a pure monopoly. Thus, industry growth
in the duopoly setup is lower compared to this of a monopoly for low levels of demand
elasticity. The opposite holds if the demand elasticity is high.
4. Two monopolies accumulating non-excludable and non-rivalrous
knowledge
In this section we examine the impact of the dynamic externality on knowledge accumulation.
Each ﬁrm is a monopolist in its own, separate market. Each ﬁrm spends on R&D, but it
cannot exclude the other ﬁrm from using this knowledge, i.e. knowledge is non-excludable.
Moreover, the other ﬁrm beneﬁts as much as the inventor, i.e. knowledge is non-rivalrous.
Thus, knowledge investment by one ﬁrm has a spillover eﬀect on all others and this aﬀects
the future knowledge stock and production cost of all ﬁrms in the same way. While we have
been using the subscript “M” to denote the pure monopoly value function and decision rules,
in this section we use the subscript “m” in order to denote this special type of monopoly,
4 The fact that we link the elasticity of demand with cost- and knowledge-production parameters is not
important for drawing this qualitative conclusion, that the determinants of demand is the key to the role
of the static market externality for industry growth. Looking at a static duopolistic model where the cost
function is C (k)=νk−α,w i t hα>0 and α = 1
η, the qualitative conclusions are the same for high and
low values of η, simply the threshold level of η for each duopolist to supply more than the monopolist now
depends on parameter α as well.
20the monopoly with knowledge spillovers.
Consider two symmetric ﬁrms, A and B, selling the ﬁnal good they produce in their own










where kt is the total stock of accumulated knowledge at time t. The knowledge production
function for both ﬁrms is given by equation (6), so the law of motion of knowledge is given
by,






B,t .( 4 5 )
Due to the symmetry of the two ﬁrms, we can focus on the behavior of ﬁrm A, without loss
of generality. The objective of ﬁrm A is to determine a ﬁnal-good supply rule qA,t = QA,m (kt)





t [D(qA,t)qA,t − C (kt)qA,t − xA,t] ,( 4 6 )
under constraint (45) and the strategies QB,m(kt) and XB,m(kt) of ﬁrm B, given the initial
knowledge stock k0 > 0. The interest rate is the same in both ﬁrms’ markets, so the discount
factor δ is the same for both ﬁrms.
The problem of ﬁrm A, written in a Bellman-equation form is,
VA,m (k)= m a x
qA,xA≥0

D(qA)qA − C (k)qA− xA +δVA,m

k +f (xA)+f ([XB (k)])

.( 4 7 )
Using the speciﬁc parametric version of the model given by equations (4), (5), and (6) enables
us to have solutions of the form




η−1 =[ XB (k)]
η
η−1 = χk .( 4 9 )
Substituting the decision rules (48) and (49), into the objective function of ﬁrm A,g i v e nb y




η − νω− χ
1− 1
η





η .( 5 0 )
In order to identify the conditions that characterize ω and χ we must form the Bellman
equation using (50). This is given by








ηqA − xA + δ
ω
1− 1
η − νω− χ
1− 1
η
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1− 1
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A .( 5 2 )

















≡ κm .( 5 3 )
We stress that κm = κM.





















,( 5 4 )
there exists a unique strategy x
η
η−1
A = χmk,s u c ht h a tχm satisﬁes equation (53)
and such that the value function is bounded and the life-time proﬁts are positive.





































.( 5 6 )
The left-hand side of equation (53), gm (χ),i ss u c ht h a tgm (0) = ∞ and
g
 
m (χ) < 0 ⇔ 1 − [1 − (η − 1)χ]δ(1 + 2χ)
1− 1
η > 0 .( 5 7 )
B u t( 5 5 )i m p l i e st h a t1 − [1 − (η − 1)χ]δ(1 + 2χ)
1− 1












































Therefore, there exists a χm > 0 satisfying (55), as it is shown by Figure 3. So, condition (54)









, so, since (55) holds, condition
(56) holds as well. 
The parameter constraint (54) implies that the proﬁtability of selling in the market should
be high enough to cover the opportunity cost associated with the exogenous interest rate, r,
and also to allow the undertaking of R&D investment.
The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by (47), for ﬁrm A, are,
D(qA)+D









  (xA) ,( 6 0 )
where  k is the stock of knowledge in the subsequent period. Applying the envelope theorem











  (XB (k))X
 
B (k)] .( 6 1 )
The marginal life-time proﬁt gains from an increase in the stock of knowledge are higher
compared to the pure monopoly case (the equivalent equation for the pure monopoly is (20)).
The marginal gains in the current period equal the sum of, (i) the decrease in the current
production cost, captured by the term −C  (k)qA, and (ii) the discounted marginal increase
in next-period’s life-time proﬁts, but, in this setup, these are enhanced by the change in R&D
investment of the other ﬁrm, due to the knowledge spillover. The term f  (XB (k))X 
B (k)
captures the marginal increase in next period’s knowledge stock,  k, due to investment by
the other ﬁrm.
























  ( xA) .( 6 2 )





the supply of the ﬁnal good in the subsequent period which complies with (59). The term
1+r+C ( kA)QA,m( k)f (xA)
1+f (XB( k))X 
B( k) is the gross eﬀective interest rate paid for investing in knowledge, the
opportunity cost of a dollar today minus the marginal return of a dollar invested in R&D,
discounted even more by the other ﬁrm’s increase in R&D investment in the subsequant








, with the latter being the supply strategy of the
pure monopolist, we can see that the necessary optimality conditions (62) and (21) diﬀer
24with respect to the discount term 1
1+f (XB( k))X 
B( k). If the laws of motion for capital were
the same for both setups, then the presence of the discount term 1
1+f (XB( k))X 
B( k) would
lead to more R&D investment in the setup of two monopolies with a knowledge spillover.
However, the fact that the law of motion in the pure monopoly is  k = k + f (x), whereas
the law of motion in the setup of this section is  k = k+f (xA)+f (xB), creates an incentive
to invest less in R&D when the knowledge spillover is present. Thus, the inﬂuence of the
dynamic externality on R&D investment and growth in the industry becomes ambiguous.
Even in the context of our simple model, the eﬀect of the dynamic externality depends on
the values of its parameters.
4.1 The impact of the dynamic externality on market supply and
industry growth
Conditions (10) and (51) imply that, for the same stock of knowledge in both monopolistic
setups, the market supply of each monopolist is exactly the same. With respect to industry
growth, the equilibrium R&D strategies [XA (k)]
η
η−1 =[ XB (k)]
η
η−1 = χmk together with (45)
imply that the growth rate of knowledge and of each monopolist’s market supply is given
by,
γm ≡ 2χm ,( 6 3 )
where χm satisﬁes condition (53). On the other hand, the growth rate of knowledge and
market supply of the pure monopoly is given by the γM that satisﬁes condition (12). In



















m = κ ,( 6 4 )
25where κ ≡ κM = κm = δη−η η−1
ν
η−1










M = κ .( 6 5 )
Re-arranging the terms of (64), so that the left-hand sides of (64) and (65) are exactly the















γm .( 6 6 )

















γm = γM .

















γm ≷ γM .
In brief, when there is a knowledge spillover, compared to a pure monopoly, ﬁrms may or may
not free-ride on each other with respect to R&D spending and industry growth may decrease
or increase, depending on the parameter values. The impact of the dynamic externality on
industry growth is ambiguous.
5. Duopoly accumulating non-excludable and non-rivalrous knowl-
edge
The industrial setup of this section reveals the impact of the dynamic market externality on
knowledge accumulation. There are two identical ﬁrms selling in the same market. Again,
26knowledge is non-excludable and non-rival. In this section we use the subscript “d”i no r d e r
to denote this special type of duopoly, the duopoly with knowledge spillovers.
Consider two symmetric ﬁrms, A and B, selling their ﬁnal good in a common market.










where kt is the total stock of accumulated knowledge at time t. The knowledge production
function for both ﬁrms is given by equation (6), so the law of motion of knowledge is, again,
given by,






B,t .( 6 7 )
Due to the symmetry of the two ﬁrms, we can focus on the behavior of ﬁrm A, without loss
of generality. The objective of ﬁrm A is to determine a ﬁnal-good supply rule qA,t = QA,d (kt)





t [D(qA,t + QB (kt))qA,t − C (kt)qA,t − xA,t] ,( 6 8 )
under the constraint (67) and the strategies QB (kt) and XB (kt) of ﬁrm B, given the initial
knowledge stock k0 > 0.
The problem of ﬁrm A, written in a Bellman-equation form is,
VA,d (k)= m a x
qA,xA≥0

D(qA + QB (k))qA − C (k)qA− xA +δVA,d





27Using the speciﬁc parametric version of the model given by equations (4), (5), and (6) enables
us to have solutions of the form






η−1 = χk .( 7 1 )
Substituting the decision rules (70) and (71), into the objective function of ﬁrm A,a st h i s







η − νω− χ
1− 1
η





η .( 7 2 )
In order to identify the conditions that characterize ω and χ we must form the Bellman
equation using (72), namely,
VA,d (k)= m a x
qA,xA≥0

[qA + QB (k)]
− 1
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1− 1
η
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A .( 7 4 )


















≡ κd .( 7 5 )
We stress that gd = gm.





















,( 7 6 )
there exists a unique strategy x
η
η−1
A = χdk, such that χd satisﬁes equation (75)
and such that the value function is bounded and the life-time proﬁts are positive.








































.( 7 8 )














d (γ) < 0 .( 7 9 )





























29shows that there exists a χd > 0 satisfying (77), as it is shown by Figure 4. So, condition









. Since (77) holds, condition
(78) holds as well. 
The ﬁrst-order conditions implied by (69) for ﬁrm A are,
D(qA + QB (k)) + D









  (xA) ,( 8 1 )
where  k is the stock of knowledge in the subsequent period. Applying the envelope theorem











  (XB (k))X
 
B (k)] .( 8 2 )
























  ( xA) .( 8 3 )





the supply of the ﬁnal good in the subsequent period which complies with (80).
The necessary condition of ﬁrm A, given by (83) has similarities with both the necessary
condition of the two monopolies with knowledge spillovers, given by (62), and with the
necessary condition of the duopoly with patent protection, given by (44). The similarity
with the setup of two monopolies with knowledge spillovers is reﬂected by the fact that the
discount term 1
1+f (XB( k))X 
B( k) also appears in (83): each ﬁrm in the duopoly with knowledge
spillovers internalizes the fact that the R&D investment by the other ﬁrm reduces its eﬀective
interest rate paid for investing in knowledge, the direct inﬂuence of the dynamic externality.








, diﬀer. But the diﬀerence between
these two market organizations is not the typical static market externality. It is a dynamic
market externality that is added. In order to see the distinction between the static market
externality and the dynamic market externality, we point out the similarities and diﬀerences
between the duopoly with patent protection and the duopoly with knowledge spillovers.









, the market-supply functions are equal. However, in equilibrium, the input of
these two market-supply functions in the next period diﬀer. It is QA,d(k + f (xA)+f (xB))
for the duopoly with spillovers, whereas it is QA,D (kA + f (xA)) for the duopoly with patent
protection. Firms internalize that the dynamic externality interacts with the market orga-
nization in the future period. The duopolistic market organization induces that, in the next
period, there will be both a market externality and a dynamic externality, and ﬁrms inter-
nalize the joint eﬀect of the two externalities into their decision-making. In other words,
ﬁrms internalize the fact that in the duopoly case with knowledge spillovers, in addition to
the dynamic externality, there is a dynamic market externality. The diﬀerence between the
dynamic market externality and the static market externality is that the dynamic market
externality appears when ﬁrms’ R&D investment decisions have a direct eﬀect on future
market supply, through their direct inﬂuence on the law of motion  k = k + f (xA)+f (xB),
which leads to QA,d(k + f (xA)+f (xB)). In the case of duopoly with patent protection,
ﬁrms’ R&D decisions have an indirect eﬀect on next period’s market supply, as each ﬁrm
accumulates its own knowledge stock, so only a static market externality aﬀects the ﬁrms’
optimizing behavior as this is reﬂected by their necessary optimal condition (44).
315.1 The impact of the dynamic market externality on market sup-
ply and industry growth
In order to capture the impact of the dynamic market externality on ﬁrm behavior, we
compare the two market organizations that diﬀer only with respect to this type of externality:
we compare the strategies of the two monopolies with knowledge spillovers with the strategies
of the duopoly with knowledge spillovers.
In two worlds, (i) with two monopolists with knowledge spillovers, and (ii) a duopoly
with knowledge spillovers, where in both market organizations the stock of knowledge is
















imply that consumers in the duopolistic market enjoy more supply and a lower price, com-
pared to consumers who live in each of the two monopolistic markets. The higher aggregate
supply of the duopoly is enhanced even more by the fact that χd >χ m, i.e. duopolists
invest more in R&D and the duopolistic industry grows more. The comparison of χd and
χm appears in ﬁgure 5. Figure 5 reﬂects the conditions (53) and (75). Since gd(χ)=gm (χ),
κm >κ d ⇔ χm <χ d. After some algebra, it is,















It is easy to check that h( 1 )=1and h  (η) > 0, for all η>1.T h e r e f o r e ,i ti sa l w a y st h e
case that κm >κ d and γm =2 χm < 2χd = γd.I n b r i e f , the dynamic market externality
increases industry growth.
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